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sity arises only where a money judgment is sought against the estate.
Where an estate has no assets of which a deficiency judgment could be
availed, a prayer for a money judgment should not be included in the
petition. But where the estate has assets that might be resorted to in the
event that the sale did not bring enough to cover the mortgage, it is
deemed advisable to pray for a deficiency judgment and have a personal
representative appointed and joined as a party to the foreclosure action.
MAURICE A. YOUNG.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
VALIDITY OF STATUTE ALLOWING MODIFICATION OF CRIMINAL
VERDICT BY APPELLATE COURT.
The defendant, Turk, procured others to fire a building so that he
might collect insurance. The fire spread to adjoining apartments, and
Miss Clara Withers was burned to death. Turk was indicted and con-
victed of murder in the first degree. Turk brought error to the Court
of Appeals of Cuyahoga County. Because there was no evidence of any
intent to kill, but merely evidence of homicide committed in perpetration
of arson, the Court of Appeals modified the verdict to "guilty of man-
slaughter." Turk v. State, 48 Ohio App. 489, 194 N.E. 425 (1935)-
Affirmed by divided court, 129 Ohio St. 245, 194 N.E. 453 (1935).
This action was taken under the authority of Section 13449-I para-
graph 4 of the Ohio General Code:
". . . if the evidence shows the defendant to be not guilty of the
degree of crime for which he is convicted, but guilty of a lesser de-
gree thereof, or of a lesser crime included therein, the court may
modify the verdict or finding accordingly without ordering a new
trial."
and of Article IV, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution:
"The courts of appeal shall have . . appellate jurisdiction .
to modify, . . .the judgments of the courts . . .of record."
It will be noticed that the statute allows modification of the verdict,
while the constitutional provision authorizes only the modification of the
judgment.
The Ohio Constitution, Article I, Sections 5 and io, guarantees the
right of trial by jury. Is this right violated by the statute quoted above?
This question was not raised in the principal case, but the facts present it.
The Ohio statute was copied from Section 1181, paragraph 6 of
the California Penal Code (1927), but the Ohio statute was made to
NOTES AND COMMENTS
read "modify the verdict," while the California Code merely allows
modifying the "judgment." The California courts have acted under
the authorization of this statute in modifying judgments by entering new
judgments reciting convictions of crimes of lesser degree than, or in-
cluded within the crime found in the jury's verdict. People v. Kelley,
208 Cal. 387, 281 Pac. 609 (1929); People v. Ciani, 104 Cal. App.
596, 286 Pac. 459 (1930); People v. Howard, 211 Cal. 322, 295
Pac. 333 (1930); People v. Peter, 125 Cal. App. 417, 14 Pac. (2d)
166 (1932). However, the question of constitutionality has never been
raised. This might be explained by the fear, on the part of the defend-
ants, that on a new trial, the more serious crime might be proved.
Other courts have modified judgments by reducing the degree of
the crime or changing the conviction to an included crime. This, in
effect, changes the verdict. These courts, except Idaho which does not
mention its authority, all acted under statutory power to modify judg-
ments. Conviction of grand larceny reduced to petty larceny, Common-
wealth v. Lawless, 103 Mass. 425 and Harrington v. State, 28 Pac.
(2d) 596 (Okla., 1933); judgment of murder in first degree reduced
to second degree, People v. O'Callahan, 2 Idaho 156, 9 Pac. 414
(1886); "verdict stands as to offense of murder but fails as to the
degree," Simpson v. State, 56 Ark. 8, 19 S.W. 99 (1892); judgment
entered for assault with intent to rape rather than rape unless state elect
to take new trial, Green v. State, 91 Ark. 497, 121 S.W. 949 (1909);
judgment of assault with deadly weapon reduced to simple assault, State
v. Little, 6o Wash. 200, 1io Pac. 8o1 (191o); judgment of assault
with intent to rape reduced to simple assault, Lebo v. State, 40 Okla.
Crim. App. In6, 267 Pac. 288 (1928); Marberry V. State, 44 Okla.
Crim. App. 134, 279 Pac. 934 (1929); evidence improperly excluded
at the trial would have proved manslaughter rather than murder, there-
fore judgment reduced to conviction of manslaughter, State v. Flory,
40 Wyo. 184, 276 Pac. 458 (1929).
Verdicts have been partially set aside and partially affirmed by an
appellate court to fit the charge sustained by the indictment, State v.
McCormick, 27 Iowa 402 (1869), and where a general verdict was
returned on two counts though the evidence supported only one count,
State v. Bugbee, 22 Vt. 32 (1849); State v. Kennedy, 88 Mo. 341
(1885). In the first case, the fact that the defendant asked for modifica-
tion might be considered a waiver of the right to a jury trial.
The appellate courts of two states have refused to review the facts
of a case, claiming that such action would be usurping the function of
the jury, State v. Edwards, 99 So. 299, 155 La. 305 (1924) ; Simmons
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v. State, 165 Md. 155, 167 At. 6o (I933), and the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has declared that it has no power to correct a verdict.
Smith v. State, lO9 Tex. Cr. App. 667, 6 S.W. (2d) 762 (1928).
The only court which has considered the constitutionality of an
appellate court's modifying a verdict is the Wyoming Court in State v.
Sorrentino, 36 Wyo. I I I, 253 Pac. 15 (1927). The defendant claimed
that instead of having to accept a modified verdict, he was constitution-
ally entitled to a new trial, the court answered this by saying that
among the facts found by the jury in returning a verdict of guilty of
murder were all the facts necessary to sustain a verdict of guilty of man-
slaughter. Though the defendant had a right to have a jury pass on the
facts once, he did not have the right to have another jury go over the
same facts. The court adopted the reasoning of State v. Fredrich, 4
Wash. 205, 29 Pac. 1055 (1892), that the difference between the
degrees of crime was a matter of law, and thus it was a proper matter
for the consideration of the appellate courts.
English appellate courts have exercised substantially the same power
as that granted the Ohio courts by the statute in question since the pass-
age of the Criminal Appeals Act in 1907. 7 Edw. 7, c. 23.
The attitude of the Wyoming court toward the question of the
constitutionality of the power to modify a verdict seems to be sound in
law and desirable in the light of the practical consideration of preventing
unnecessary retrials.
ROBERT B. GosLINE.
CONTRACTS
INFANTS' CONTRACTS-LIABILITY OF INFANT FOR DAMAGES
CAUSED BY BREACH OF CONTRACT TO LEASE.
A ten-months' lease for a summer cottage was executed by infant
lessees for a total sum of $135, of which $45 was paid down, the
remainder being payable later. They failed to make payment as promised
and notified the lessor that they were not of age and asked for the
return of their $45. This request was refused and the infant lessees
brought this action for the amount paid. Defendant counter-claimed
for the damage suffered by reason of her inability to rent her property.
Held: Counter-claim disallowed; plaintiffs are entitled to recover the
full amount'which they had paid in advance. Hewitt v. Klein, et al., 47
Ohio App. 40 Ohio L.R. 347, 355 (1933)-
It is well established law that an infant is bound by contracts for
necessaries. Whether the particular thing in dispute constitutes a neces-
